



# SUMMARY REPORT

## 2018 LESSONS LEARNED WORKSHOP

*“STABILITY POLICING – Let’s Learn and Innovate”*



NATO SP COE Lessons Learned Branch, 1<sup>st</sup> September 2019



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## FOREWORD FROM THE DIRECTOR

I am pleased to present this Lessons Learned Report based on the outcomes of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Stability Policing Lessons Learned Workshop (SPLLWS) organized and hosted by the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NATO SP COE) from the 9<sup>th</sup> to the 12<sup>th</sup> of October 2018.

The WS was organized in 4 syndicates, involving 38 Subject Matter Experts belonging to different military, police, civilian, national and international Organizations, and focusing on 4 important topics related to the area of Stability Policing, namely:

- NATO cooperation with other International Organizations for collecting/sharing Stability Policing Observations, Best Practices, Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned in order to increase its subject matter expertise;
- Command and control of the Stability Policing Component within NATO Operations - best practices and lessons identified;
- NATO Stability Policing interaction and interoperability with the Host Nation and International Organizations, within the framework of criminal investigations;
- The most appropriate structure a Stability Policing Unit should have, building on existing organizational models such as those of NATO – Multinational Specialized Units, UN-Formed Police Units, EU – Formed Police Units /Integrated Police Units and EGF- Integrated Police Units/ Formed Police Units.

All these topics have been analysed, discussed and developed during the WS, and are hereinafter presented in dedicated chapters.

As a general conclusion, you will find an assessment and a professional overview on the way NATO can cooperate with other relevant IOs in the area of Stability Policing Lessons Learned, as well as in the framework of Criminal Investigations.

At the same time, the Report provides the best identified solutions concerning the command, the control and the most appropriate structures of Stability Policing Units proposed to perform police-related missions under NATO's umbrella.

I wish to underline that the creation of this NATO SP COE product would not have been possible without the substantial contribution from the Subject Matter Experts involved in the Workshop.

Their invaluable input made the understanding of NATO's military context possible, as well as the specific adaptation of the existing UN or EU solutions to the standards of the Alliance.

Finally, I would like to thank everyone for their involvement, hoping that NATO's Stability Policing area will continue to benefit from their support.

**Andrea PARIS**  
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DIRECTOR



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**Based on:** The outcomes of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Stability Policing Lessons Learned Workshop gathered with the professional contribution of 38 civilian, police and military Subject Matter Experts.

At the NATO SP COE in Vicenza, Italy, from December 2018 to July 2019.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The global developments and the ever-changing security environment that we are witnessing require NATO to continuously transform and adapt.

The NATO Stability Policing (SP) Centre of Excellence (COE) tried to mirror some of the International Community concerns by drafting, between 2016-2018, a Joint Analysis Report (JAR) on “*Stability Policing within NATO*”, having NATO HQ SACT as Customer.

In line with the established analysis objectives, the JAR had to answer the question: “*How can Stability Policing contribute to the Alliance efforts in Projecting Stability?*”.

The JAR’s conclusions and recommendations identified the necessity to develop NATO Stability Policing as both a Concept and Capability. Of course, NATO cannot do this by itself, disregarding the experience of its contributors and of the other IOs, but needs to operate within the realm of the Comprehensive Approach (CA).

In addition to the JAR, from 2016 to 2017 the Centre substantially contributed as external coordinator to the NATO ACT Concept & Development Campaign aimed at developing the first NATO Stability Policing Concept ever produced by the Alliance.

As the voice of experience is the determining factor in building a real SP capability, the NATO SP COE tried to create in 2017 the framework for developing the NATO Stability Policing Lessons Learned (LL) Community of Interest, by organising the first Stability Policing Lessons Learned Workshop (WS).

The aforementioned LL activities created the conditions for a progressive and thorough approach to the Stability Policing topics in 2018, during the second SPLLWS:

- NATO cooperation with other International Organizations for collecting/sharing Stability Policing Observations, Best Practices, Lessons Identified (LI) and Lessons Learned in order to increase its Stability Policing expertise;
- Command and control for the Stability Policing Component within NATO

Operations;

- NATO SP interaction and interoperability with the Host Nation (HN) and with International Organizations (IO) within the framework of Criminal Investigations (CI);
- The most appropriate structure for Stability Policing Units following the organizational models of the existing NATO – Multinational Specialized Units, UN-Formed Police Units, EU – Formed Police Units /Integrated Police Units and EGF- Integrated Police Units/ Formed Police Units.

Our interest in defragmenting the concerns in terms of SP missions and tasks came from the will to be able to better implement future mandates for supporting Host Nation Police Forces in creating a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE).

To this end, 38 participants from 10 different countries (France, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and USA) and 22 organizations<sup>1</sup> shared their experiences, knowledge and vision within the WS' four syndicates.

The syndicates' conclusions and recommendations reflected in the present Report will be shared among NATO bodies and International Organisations, to be further considered and possibly integrated in future Conceptual Frameworks.

These do not go far from those expressed at the recent 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, regarding the respect for individual liberty, human rights, the rule of law, and the contribution to the international community's efforts to Project Stability beyond the Alliance's borders.

## 2. METHODOLOGY OF THE REPORT

Based on the initial outcomes of the JAR and on the first SPLLS, the Project Team (PT) expanded its research in order to develop the background information needed to pave the way to the second SPLLS.

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<sup>1</sup> Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), EEAS-CPCC, EEAS-CMPD, EUROGENDFOR, European Union Military Staff, EULEX Kosovo, Guardia Civil, Italian Army Post Conflict Operations Study Centre, Italian Carabinieri, Italian Joint Operations Command, Italian Joint Operation Headquarters, JFC NAPLES, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Italy, NATO SFA COE, NATO SHAPE, NATO SP COE, Romanian Gendarmerie, Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Turkish Gendarmerie, UN, USARAF/SETAF, KFOR MSU.



As a first step, the PT conducted a preliminary research on the four topics in order to understand the existing knowledge gaps and specific requirements. This included a review of policies and directives belonging to NATO and other IOs involved in “Policing”, such as the UN, the EU, the AU and the OSCE.

Based on the initial findings, the four facilitators started the discussions having as a guidance the existing NATO LL process, which begins with the topic to be analysed and continues with the discussion, conclusion, and recommendation phases.

It is worth mentioning that during the discussion phase, the participating subject matter experts gave their valuable input related to the specific topics, by answering the six already well known questions (Who, What, Where, When, Why and How).

From November 2018 until the end of March 2019, the LL Branch Project Team tried to frame the outcomes of the 4 syndicates within the existing international juridical norms and doctrines.

The result of the aforementioned work is this specific Report, to be sent for further consideration and implementation to HQ SACT, considering that for the time being, other two strategic documents as the Joint Analysis Report on “*Stability Policing within NATO*” and the NATO Stability Policing Concept are being analysed by NATO International Military Staff (IMS).

HQ SACT as an identified Tasking Authority (TAs) will therefore be responsible to decide on the report’s further implementation. This entails committing resources and appointing/tasking one or more Action Bodies (AB), for the tracking of transformation from Lessons Identified to Lessons Learned, and the latter’s possible exploitation within the future specific Conceptual Frameworks, in cooperation and coordination with other relevant NATO Bodies and International Organizations.

### 3. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

The purpose of the Report is to provide the Alliance with a professional overview on the four Stability Policing-related topics, which will help understanding the way this area can be properly developed and implemented within NATO.

At the same time, the Report's findings are meant to support the current NATO IMS/MC processes for further assessment and approval of the NATO Stability Policing Concept and the Joint Analysis Report issued and assumed by HQ SACT with the support of the NATO SP COE.

Additionally, the findings may benefit those NATO Bodies involved in planning and conducting OPS or EXE and those Organizations of NATO Members and Partners in charge or willing to perform Stability Policing within NATO.

#### 4. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The following chapters provide an overview of the key selected topics and are not meant to be exhaustive from an analytical point.

For a better understanding of the context, the supporting Annexes should also be read.

In this regard, the 4 topics addressed during the WS are structured and reflected within the relevant chapters of the present Report and supporting annexes, referring to:

***1. The way NATO can cooperate with other IOs (e.g. UN / EU / OSCE) for collecting/sharing OBSs, BPs, LI, in order to increase its Stability Policing expertise.***

The chapter identifies opportunities and means for international cooperation to share and make use of Stability Policing / Police Lessons Learned products.

***2. Command and control for the Stability Policing Component within NATO Operations - best practices and lessons identified***

This chapter seeks to provide a more comprehensive view and approach regarding the Stability Policing C2 component within NATO Operations, keeping the doctrinal, juridical, technical and international cooperation implications into consideration as well.

***3. NATO SP interaction and interoperability with HN and with IOs within the framework of criminal investigations.***

The chapter provides the International Community with the NATO SP perspective on Criminal Investigations and the role that this component can play for ensuring the protection of civilians and the upholding of human rights,



contribution to SASE, force protection, counter insurgency and counter-terrorism and a smoother transition of powers to Host Nation Police Forces or International Civil Police missions.

***4. The most appropriate structure of the Stability Policing Unit following the organizational model of the existing NATO - MSU, UN-FPU, EU – FPU/IPU and EGF IPU.***

This chapter describes experiences and provides an overview of the existing NATO, UN, EU and EGF units that perform police missions, addressing both reinforcement and/or replacement of Host Nation Police Forces. Based on the above, and keeping in mind the interoperability needs between NATO and the relevant IOs, the syndicate managed to identify the most appropriate structures of the NATO Stability Policing Units that are proposed to be kept into consideration by the Alliance. The outcomes of this specific working group are reflected as well in Annexes A and B to this report.

### **3. MAIN CONCLUSIONS**

- a. There is a real need for International Organizations to cooperate by sharing and using Stability Policing/Police Lessons Learned Products. The “SP definition” represents the capstone for a common understanding.
- b. There is no doctrine that covers C2 functions in the framework of replacement and reinforcement missions.
- c. The green box-blue box concept is mostly valid but the current lack of a NATO doctrine and the related switch to TACON, leads to interoperability problems, also due to the absence of this aspect from training and exercises.
- d. There is a need to create a specific NATO Stability Policing Capability that includes subject matter expertise at all operational levels and a tailored Stability Policing asset that could be called Stability Policing Unit (SPU), based on the MSU and similar to those deployed by other IOs.
- e. In his/her capacity, the Stability Policing Commander, is the SP advisor to the NATO Force Commander; this model was successfully used in Bosnia and currently in Kosovo within KFOR.
- f. The management of public safety and order, including the investigation of petty and serious crimes has not always been addressed in a

comprehensive, coordinated manner by the International Community that supported the HN.

- g. Addressing criminality within a fragile environment is always a challenge from the military perspective and requires a specialized approach. The NATO Stability Policing Criminal Investigation (CI) Task is very likely to be seen as indispensable for reaching stability.
- h. NATO Stability Policing CI capacity may assist the military aspect of the mission by contributing to civil military cooperation (CIMIC), force protection (FP), counterinsurgency, reducing risk and ensuring a safe and secure environment (SASE). It can be considered as tool for a smoother transition to Host Nation police forces or international civil police missions.
- i. As a first mover within the ToO, NATO's intervention capacity requires a CI mandated capacity to be coordinated amongst different involved IOs. Therefore, there is a need for the executive mandate and the cooperation within the CI framework to be **clearly stated** within the **UN resolution /SOFA/MoU/TA**.
- j. NATO may contribute to the efforts undertaken by the International Community (IC) in building the Host Nation Police Forces (HNPF) CI capacity. This can be accomplished by specialised NATO forces who possess the knowledge and skills to undertake this task (i.e. Gendarmerie-Type forces, Military Police), developed by carrying out similar tasks in their countries of origin. These assets have the capacity of surviving in hostile environments and they can either replace Host Nation Police Forces (when either not existing or unable/unwilling to execute their duties) or reinforce them through training, mentoring, monitoring, advising, partnering and reforming, raising their standards of efficiency and effectiveness to an acceptable level.
- k. International mandates do not always foresee providing assistance and training in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. Because of this, the NATO planning process does not address precisely and in a comprehensive manner the lines of effort to give the HN strength and legitimacy as soon as possible, specifically looking to building the law enforcement and the CI capacity.

- l. There is a need for the basic self-sustainable NATO Stability Policing Unit to be based on a modular structure and to be adaptable to the two possible scenarios (reinforcement and replacement missions).
- m. The need to have SP SMEs embedded in the NATO Task Force HQs has been heavily underlined.
- n. The level of the unit remains to be defined according to the mandated tasks and operational needs (ranging from Battalion to Brigade level).

#### 4. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. To establish an International study group intended to identify and to determine the juridical framework or ways for IOs to share and use the Stability Policing/Police Lessons Learned Products. The same study group should try to define SP and link LL information sharing on SP to enlarge existing processes in IOs including overall LL products.
- b. The Stability Policing C2 component should be framed by a doctrine for both replacement and reinforcement missions. This should be taken into account when revising AJP-3.22 and during the building process of the future NATO ATP-103 on "*Replacement and Reinforcement of the HNPF*".
- c. The mandate provided by the legal framework (UNSCR, SOFA, MOUs, SOP etc.) should contain specific executive guidelines, in order to facilitate the design of condition-based SP C2 architecture.
- d. The green box-blue box concept should be integrated within the NATO doctrine, training and exercises.
- e. NATO should update the capability codes and statements (CC&S) referring specifically to the Stability Policing Unit, on the base of the MSU already tested and approved integrated model, similarly to other IOs (i.e. Formed Police Unit or Integrated Police Unit).
- f. The SP expertise should be embedded in all levels of the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure for enhancing the SP C2 capacity.
- g. The International community and NATO should consider the CI-SP task as an effective tool for:
  - ensuring the protection of civilians and Human Rights;

- contributing to reach SASE;
  - increasing civil military cooperation and contribution to Force Protection;
  - addressing Counter Insurgency and Terrorism;
  - increasing NATO and HNPF accountability;
  - a smoother transition to Host Nation Police Forces or International Civil Police missions.
- h. Criminal Investigation capacities in both replacement and reinforcement missions should be streamlined and coordinated with other International Organisations to make them cost/effective. Specialized gendarmerie type forces can achieve this tasks under either the NATO, UN, or EU umbrellas.
- i. NATO shall interact with those ***international police and justice components*** that addressed criminality in different ToOs in order to collect observations, lessons identified, lessons learned, and best practices within the law enforcement and CI framework.
- j. International Actors (NATO, UN, EU, OSCE, AU, and other partners) must include building a proper Criminal Investigation capacity on their priority list in order to be able to reach a SASE for the benefit of the HN, and for reaching the Missions End State.
- k. NATO shall contribute to the International Community (IC) efforts in building the HNPF CI capacity through specialised NATO forces who possess the knowledge and skills to undertake this task (i.e. Gendarmerie-Type forces, Military Police), developed by carrying out similar tasks in their countries of origin.
- l. The self-sustainable unit shall be subordinate to the NATO Joint Force Commander, or directly to the NATO Body in charge to coordinate the specific operation.
- m. The level of the SP unit will be defined according to the NATO mandate, task and operational needs (ranging from Battalion to Brigade level). Anyway, the option regarding the minimum level of 160 police officers for a SP unit was considered optimal.
- n. It is also recommended to insert SP SMEs within the NATO TF HQs.

- o. The aforementioned structures will be tailored according to ToO's requirements (CJSOR included) by adapting all the elements through a modular approach (e.g. increasing personnel within the branches and enhancing the operational or logistic elements).

## 5. DISTRIBUTION LIST

1.	NATO ACT FOGO CHAMPION
2.	NATO ACT Joint Doctrine Lessons Learned Branch
3.	NATO ACT - Joint Force Development Division - COE Programme Development Branch
4.	NATO ACT – Stability Policing Subject Matter Expert
5.	Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU)
6.	Centre for International Studies (CeSI) – Centro Studi Internazionali
7.	EEAS - Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Directorate
8.	EEAS - Crisis Management Planning Directorate
9.	EULEX - Executive Division
10.	European Union Military Staff (EUMS)
11.	Post Conflict Operations Study Centre
12.	European Gendarmerie Force - Permanent Headquarters (EGF-PHQ)
13.	Hellenic National Defence General Staff / Policy & Strategy Branch / Transformation Directorate
14.	ITA Permanent Joint Headquarters – AVAC
15.	NATO Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC-B)
16.	NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples (JFC-N)
17.	NATO Command and Control Centre of Excellence
18.	NATO Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)
19.	NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)
20.	NATO KFOR - Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU)
21.	NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence
22.	NATO Multinational Division North East
23.	NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-ITA (NRDC-ITA)
24.	NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM) - Afghanistan - CJ5
25.	NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence
26.	NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) – J 7 / PM
27.	United Nations – Police Division – Standing Police Capacity Brindisi
28.	United States Army Africa (USARAF)
29.	United States Army Center for Army Lessons Learned
30.	USA Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
31.	Carabinieri General Headquarters – Plans and Military Police Office
32.	Czech Military Police Main Headquarters – Chief of Czech Military Police
33.	French Gendarmerie - Defence and Public Order Directorate
34.	General HQs of the Turkish Gendarmerie - Strategy Dev. & External Relations
35.	Guardia Civil General Headquarters - International Cooperation Secretariat
36.	Polish Military Gendarmerie Headquarters – General Commander
37.	Romanian Gendarmerie General Headquarters – General Commander
38.	Royal Netherlands Marechaussee – General Commander

## CHAPTER 1

Stability Policing as such is not exclusive to NATO; different International Organisations such as the EU, the UN and the OSCE, in fact adopt the concept but under a different terminology.

With this in mind, the working group operated in order to identify the way the International Organizations can cooperate in this field, specifically around the areas of: Observations, Best Practice, Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned.

### SYNDICATE #1

*“The way NATO can cooperate with other International Organizations (e.g. UN/EU/ OSCE) for collecting/sharing Observations, Best Practices, Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned in order to increase its Stability Policing expertise”.*

### 1.1 OBSERVATION

The capacity of International Organisations to share information is an area of concern, and this has an impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of International Missions.

There is a general consensus that the creation of a dedicated Share Point could address this shortcoming. This could be intended:

- as having regular gatherings of the community of interest;
- as an IT platform open to all stakeholders;
- as a publication;
- through social media;
- as a general need to increase the level of engagement amongst different organisations on this specific subject matter;

Clearly one or more of the above mentioned suggestions could be taken into consideration.

### 1.2 DISCUSSION

Starting from the observations, the working group discussed the current state of play, attempted to identify existing gaps and suggested possible



remedial actions.

As a general statement, attendees reported an uneven level of understanding of the concept of Stability Policing, which could be addressed by sharing lessons learned and by developing a community of interest in the subject.

A common understanding on the objectives of Stability Policing and how to achieve them to reach a desired end state was also highlighted; this is important because a lack of knowledge on the possible desired results of a mission can hamper the capacity of officers in the field to design the best plan to achieve this.

A need to increase the level of awareness on the Lessons Learned process amongst the International Community was identified, together with the need to identify whether the latter has the right resources or if new tools need to be created.

The unhealthy competition that sometime exists between different International Organisations could be seen as a matter of concern: these should operate beyond their differences for the achievement of an overall greater goal.

At the highest level, International Organisations should identify the best system to share information amongst those highlighted in the previous section: implementation should be time-bound and come with a clear deadline in mind.

There needs to be a legal framework that allows stakeholders to share this information, and there should also be an agreement to work following terms of references which avoid duplication of efforts.

The process identified by these terms of reference is actually more important than the data itself (CISE Common Information Sharing Environment). Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) should also be considered as part of the community of interest, as their work can complement or in some cases integrate that of the major International Organisations.

This could be cost-effective as well, since the latter may have funds at their disposal to implement relevant initiatives. The above-mentioned suggestions would need testing to assess their effectiveness.

### 1.3 CONCLUSIONS

The discussion led the working group to draw the following conclusions:

- a. There is a real need for International Organizations to cooperate by sharing and using Stability Policing/Police Lessons Learned Products. The “SP definition” represents the capstone for a common understanding;
- b. There is a need for Political/strategic levels to define what can be shared and validated with other IOs. Moreover, the Political/strategic levels should define main courses of actions/ lines of operations (CoAs/LoOs). Nevertheless, it is perceived that tactical and operational levels contributions are vital, since their outcomes are important for the LL process;
- c. It is required to foster the internal and general awareness on SP LL by investing more in common understanding, discussions and elaborations of the issue. This can lead to the establishment of a cross organizational SP Community of Interest;
- d. There is a need to prevent the possible overlapping of efforts and the wasting of time, money and resources;
- e. To overcome national/institutional political interest is the key. It is paramount to compromise aiming at finding a common ground;
- f. Even if the aspiration of having all the IOs signing a single MoU/agreement is ambitious, this can easily lead to the establishment of a chosen ShPo, opened to all IOs as soon as they are ready to cooperate properly to the project;
- g. It is strongly required to foster the internal and general awareness of SP LL by investing more in common understanding, discussions and elaborations of the issue. This can lead to the establishment of a cross organizational SP Community of Interest;
- h. There is a need to clarify the NATO military objectives in order to enhance cooperation, and, at the end state, facilitate transition with other IOs SP assets or HN actors;
- i. Both SP military and civilian institutional actors are needed to take part in every step of the process, so as to better merge different approaches;
- j. Acknowledging that SP is not a key activity for all other actors, focusing interaction with IOs through overall sharing of LI in the larger area of security

(and defence) could raise awareness of SP as a concept.

## 1.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

The above-mentioned conclusions brought the working group to identify the following recommendations:

- a. To establish an International study group intended to identify and to determine the juridical framework or ways for IOs to share and use the Stability Policing/Police Lessons Learned Products. The same study group should try to define SP and link LL information sharing on SP to enlarge existing processes in IOs including overall LL products.
- b. To establish a joint analysis team and map SP capabilities involving other IOs.
- c. Staffs must be engaged in exploring modalities to enhance coordination, complementarities and cooperation. Staffs should regularly exchange ideas about LL, sharing information and coordination of efforts.
- d. To promote the issuing of internal policies and regulations to enable information sharing and to overcome national/institutional limitations.
- e. After judging the needs and available resources and/or, if needed, having elaborated or developed a new tool, call for a workshop/working group with SP LL SMEs to define the details of ShPo chosen.

Its tasks could include: to list of SP tasks; to elaborate concepts of training and curricula; to launch structures to ensure implementation of LIs and to involve the appropriate level of staff to share experience during the meetings. For this last requirement, a group study could be established in order to identify the appropriate tool to satisfy the identified needs.

Having all this in mind, the recommended NATO tasking authorities were identified in the International Military Staff (IMS), Allied Command Transformation and the Joint Analysis Lesson Learned Centre (JALLC).

## CHAPTER 2

This working group was expected to identify the most effective approach adopted to perform Command and Control (C2) functions on a Stability Policing component operating in the wider framework of a NATO Operation, building upon experiences, observations and best practices.

### SYNDICATE #2

*“Command and control for Stability Policing Component within NATO Operations- best practices and lessons identified”.*

This chapter also looks at the principles that underpin the way in which command and control is set up and supported.

### 2.1 OBSERVATION

The Stability Policing Command and Control component is still not clearly defined, and this might affect the management of risks associated with the escalation of violence, degradation of public order and security in theatres of operation.

### 2.2 DISCUSSION

The discussion opened defining the meaning of C2, a military expression that corresponds to the civilian concepts of control, management and leadership. The commander leads by means of orders or instructions; he coordinates the activities and at the same time motivates his men through example.

There was a consensus built around the fact that an efficient C2 function enables Stability Policing assets to perform their duties in the most efficient and effective way.

According to the existing NATO doctrine<sup>2</sup>, *“Command and control is the*

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<sup>2</sup> NATO ATP-3.2.2 “Command and Control of Allied Land Forces” edition B version 1, December 2016.

*authority, responsibilities, and activities of military commanders in the direction and coordination of military forces and in the implementation of orders related to the execution of operations [...]. Command support is the people, leadership, organizational structure, equipment, and doctrine components combined as an integrated system at all levels of command to manage resources, [...]. Through C2, he initiates the actions of, influences, and synchronizes the elements of combat power to create desired effects that support achievement of his objectives”.*

C2 is a particularly important function given the context that often surrounds assets deployed in a Stability Policing mission, which leads them to perform activities, which often involve a high degree of unpredictability. These include efforts in the areas of public security and public order, criminal investigations, the performance of high-risk arrests, negotiation and mediation, protecting people (especially vulnerable groups) and property, counter terrorism, counter-organized crime, war crime investigations and assistance to international courts.

Cooperation was also identified as a very important aspect, since there are many stakeholders operating in the operational environment Stability Policing is deployed in; these may include other NATO assets such as, for example, those performing Security Force Assistance (SFA) but also assets deployed by other International Organisations. Clearly, there needs to be a coordinated effort in building the capacity of the Host Nation to avoid duplications, redundancies and ultimately to engage funds efficiently. The same goes for reinforcing missions that aim to build Host Nation Police Forces through training, monitoring, evaluating, advising, mentoring, partnering, and reforming activities.

For the above-mentioned reasons, the Stability Policing C2 function goes well beyond its boundaries, and impacts the Host Nation Police in its wider sense, including its higher management and Ministry of Interior, and the other NATO components and International Organisations.

Even though the current NATO ATP on “Command and Control of Allied Land Forces” does not specifically refer to Stability Policing C2, at tactical level the green box/blue box model has worked already for more than twenty years, starting with the engagement of NATO in the Balkans with its SFOR mission in

Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The working group then looked at the several provisions regarding the C2 function in Stability Policing.

At an operational level, the French doctrine<sup>3</sup> is developed around the Blue Box/Green Box/Red Box system:

- a. *The Green Box characterizes a normal situation in which troops (joint land troops and police component, in its broad sense) routinely accomplish their mission. The police component operates under TACON of the joint force.*
- b. *The Blue Box characterizes a tense situation in which manifestations or growing protests threaten the maintenance of law and order. MSU-type or police component/ type of units obtain main command over the military command in charge of the area for the duration of the manifestations. The police component commander has his own troops in addition to joint troops deployed to support him.*
- c. *The Red Box is the ultimate breakdown and refers to a situation where police procedures to maintain or restore law and order do not longer apply. These operation modes are replaced by conflicts of military nature with the use of lethal force. Land units take over the control of operations”.*

This Green/Blue/Red Box system falls within the scope of ATP – 3.2.1.1.4,<sup>4</sup> but needs to be further developed in future doctrines<sup>5</sup> concerning Stability Policing missions and tasks, in order to establish clear C2 guidelines that specifically look into iterations between Police and Military assets.

Looking at the structure of two NATO Missions currently operating under different Joint Force Commands, the working group identified KFOR (NATO Mission in Kosovo) and RSM (NATO Mission in Afghanistan) and analysed their diverse organisational structure.

The Multinational Specialised Units (MSU), which operate within KFOR, can be a model for best practice although there is room for improvement in the definition of the relations between the military chain of command and the local judicial authorities.

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<sup>3</sup> French Joint Doctrine (FRA) JD-3.18 Deployment of the Gendarmerie *Nationale* in Overseas Operations, no.126/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 10 July 2013.

<sup>4</sup> NATO ATP-3.2.1.1 “Guidance for the conduct of tactical stability activities and tasks, edition b version 1”.

<sup>5</sup> Future NATO ATP 103 on “Replacement and Reinforcement of the HNPF”.



The current NATO doctrine<sup>6</sup> for conduct of operations envisions that *“the Provost Marshal is the JFCs adviser on security, order and discipline inside the force. Together with the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) commander (if established), he is responsible for matters related to the civilian population security issues and Police matters”*.

Looking now at NATO RSM, as an example of a non-executive mission, COMTAAC-WEST is the Police Advisor for both the Afghan Police Chief and Afghan Army Commander.

Currently, NATO stability policing references which impact on C2 are not foreseen, excepting for the above mentioned case of the MSU Commander within the KFOR mission who is the advisor of the COMKFOR on all civilian police matters<sup>7</sup>.

The working group also highlighted the importance of a clear mandate for a Stability Policing Mission, such as, for example, that provided by the United Nations. Command control and coordination should be clearly defined in the mandate to avoid internal conflicts and misunderstandings.

The discussion concluded mentioning that there is still no reference to Stability Police assets within NATO, despite this was recommended in the NATO SP COE Joint Analysis Report entitled “Stability Policing within NATO”. This may have further implications for C2.

Within the same context, and in light of what was discussed throughout the syndicate, the idea of having an overarching specialized authority that oversees both reinforcement and replacement missions is self-explanatory.

## 2.3 CONCLUSIONS

The discussion led the working group to identify the following conclusions:

- a. There is no doctrine that covers C2 functions in the framework of replacement and reinforcement missions.
- b. Replacement missions currently lack a specific regulation regarding responsibilities that fall under the military chain of command and its functional relation with the judicial authority: this can cause conflict since the latter could be taking decisions that determine the conduct of Stability Policing assets.

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<sup>6</sup> AJP-3 (B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of OPS, Para 2A12 - Provost Marshal.

<sup>7</sup> <https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/units/msu>.

- c. The green box-blue box concept is mostly valid but the current lack of a NATO doctrine and the related switch to TACON, leads to interoperability problems, also due to the absence of this aspect from training and exercises.
- d. There is a need to create a specific NATO Stability Policing Capability that includes subject matter expertise at all operational levels and a tailored Stability Policing asset that could be called Stability Policing Unit (SPU), based on the MSU and similar to those deployed by other IOs.
- e. In his/her capacity as Stability Policing Commander, he/she is the advisor about the Stability Policing to the NATO Force Commander, being successfully used in Bosnia and currently in Kosovo within KFOR.
- f. The MSU subordination to COM KFOR is considered as C2 best practice.
- g. The Mandate of a Stability Policing Mission needs to be clear and to define the scope of the input expected by all stakeholders for de-conflicting possible overlaps.

## 2.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

The above-mentioned conclusions led the working group to identify the following recommendations

- a. The Stability Policing C2 component should be framed by a doctrine for both replacement and reinforcement missions. This should be taken into account when revising AJP-3.22 and during the building process of the future NATO ATP-103 on “Replacement and Reinforcement of the HNPF”.
- b. The mandate provided by the legal framework (UNSCR, SOFA, MOUS, SOP etc.) should contain specific executive guidelines, in order to facilitate the design of condition-based SP C2 architecture.
- c. A capacity building component could be foreseen, to ensure coordination between SFA and SP. Creating a capacity building (joint) function could be theorized.
- d. The functional relation with the judicial authority and the subordination to a military chain of command should be always taken into account. Moreover the legal framework for full replacement missions of, should foresee that the HN judiciary does not have “functional guidance/authority” (“TACON”) over SP assets, which should remain under full TACON of the NATO Force.
- e. The green box-blue box concept should be integrated within the NATO

doctrine, training and exercises.

- f. NATO should update the capability codes and statements (CC&S) referring specifically to the Stability Policing Unit, on the base of the MSU model already tested and approved integrated model, similarly to other IOs (i.e. Formed Police Unit or Integrated Police Unit).
- g. The Stability Policing expertise should be embedded in all levels of the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure for enhancing its C2 capacity.
- h. Shortfalls can be anticipated if the NATO Planning Process will include:
  - SP inputs as from the initial phases of COPD (i.e. horizon scanning, etc.);
  - SP SMEs in the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Teams;
  - common planning with Follow on Force (or organization);
  - developed and improved cooperation, and common planning mechanisms, amongst different IOs.

## CHAPTER 3

The expected outcome was to better understand the role of NATO within the framework of Criminal Investigations (CI), as the regular prime mover within the theatre of operations, from two perspectives:

- Stability Policing replacement missions (when the Host Nation Police or a recognised government is non-existing);
- Stability Policing reinforcement missions (when the Host Nation Police is existing and reliable but the effectiveness is limited).

### SYNDICATE #3

*“The NATO Stability Policing interaction and interoperability with the Host Nation and International Organisations within the Criminal Investigation Framework”.*

### 3.1 STABILITY POLICING REPLACEMENT MISSIONS

#### 3.1.1 OBSERVATION

Soon after their deployment in a theatre of operations, NATO forces witnessed and had to deal with serious and petty crimes, in a situation characterized by a security vacuum (no police force and judicial system), and without having a specific mandate and specialised assets assigned to support the host nation in combating criminality.

#### 3.1.2 DISCUSSION

In the context of a crisis, the supported Host Nation (HN) and its local population are strongly affected and have expectations for the International Community (NATO as a prime mover) to tackle a series of challenges. The latter include the prevention and punishment of serious and petty crimes, protection of victims of war and of national minorities and refugees, enforcement of laws and human rights conventions, elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, protection of civil rights and liberties.

Post deployment, the management of public safety and public order including the investigation of crimes against humanity, has not been addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner by the International Community (IC), which has the role to support the Host Nation.

In order to better understand this, let us have a look at the particular situation of Kosovo in the beginning of the crisis.

By studying the documents issued at that time, we can easily observe that the responsibilities given to NATO KFOR through the UN Security Council Resolution<sup>8</sup> included:

- establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons could return home in safety, the international civil presence could operate, a transitional administration could be established, and humanitarian aid could be delivered;
- ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence could have taken responsibility for this task;
- supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence.

Regarding all these tasks given to NATO, the subsequent UN Report<sup>9</sup> reflected reality on the ground: "While KFOR is currently responsible for maintaining both public safety and civil law and order, its ability to do so is limited due to the fact that it is still in the process of building up its forces. The absence of a legitimate police force, both international and local, is deeply felt, and therefore will have to be addressed as a matter of priority."

Regardless of the geographic and temporal context, achieving all these tasks within an area devastated by the conflict with a security and judicial system vacuum (no police force) and with a fragile environment would not be possible if the concerns/security problems of the local population were not addressed at all or in a qualified manner. Serious or petty crimes that affect the local population cannot be properly pursued in the absence of a CI capacity, one of NATO's core stability policing tasks<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> Paragraph 9 of the UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999).

<sup>9</sup> Report of the UN Secretary General from 12th of July 1999.

<sup>10</sup> Stability policing tasks envisioned by the Annex A to Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing (AJP-3.22).

Experience shows that international organizations (IOs), such as NATO, UN, EU, OSCE, AU and partner nations, on bilateral or multilateral agreement basis can be involved within the CI framework to support the HN efforts towards stabilization and reconstruction. Therefore, international cooperation is essential for supporting the HN through filling its CI gaps from the Police perspective. This should be the case for a period as short as possible in order to transition once the capacity is developed.

The initial assessment on criminality is not always sufficient in a rapidly changing environment, therefore the IC should be able to offer its expertise to the HN through providing monitoring and updates throughout the mission.

For an adequate support to the HN, it is also essential to know the historical and current criminal investigation capacity and the structure of its institutions in order to plan the engagement in terms of required specialized forces, human resources strength, logistics, and financial needs.

It is a minimum requirement to have a critical number of criminal justice practitioners with the required specialized skills to prevent, detect, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate different cases. The criminal investigation capacity which comprises police, prosecutors, and courts needs to be assessed as a construct in order to understand the gaps in strength, interoperability, education and training needs.

The boundaries imposed by the applicable legal codes must be taken fully into account. According to the principle "*Nullum crimen sine lege*", the assessment of the local juridical framework (criminal law and criminal procedure code) is an important preliminary factor, so that local population complies and accepts the actions taken within the framework of Criminal Investigations conducted by the International Community, which includes NATO. Moreover, the legal provisions applicable to CI may be correlated and interpreted together with social, cultural, religious, and ethnic elements.

CI requires an approach in line with the relevant legal framework, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols and the specific local context.



As outlined in the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept<sup>11</sup>, crisis management is one of NATO's fundamental security tasks. It can involve military and non-military measures to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. Within this spectrum, NATO needs to support the local population, HN and IC institutions in addressing the common criminality, crimes like genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression.

The aforementioned require special attention and need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner, and sometimes, according to the Rome Statute<sup>12</sup> together with the International Criminal Court (ICC), nevertheless NATO Stability Policing CI Task shall be seen more like an indispensable ability in support of reaching stability.

For achieving such a specific task, there is a need to employ specific means such as Community Policing, described by one of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence Framework Concepts<sup>13</sup> as: “the systematic use of partnership and the implementation of collaborative effort between the deployed SP assets, the indigenous police, when existing, and the community, to effectively and efficiently identify, prevent and solve problems of crime, the fear of crime and social disorder, in order to contribute to establish a safe and secure environment (SASE). It includes proximity policing instruments”.

International cooperation on this matter and the limit of the executive mandate need to be stated clearly in the UN resolution /SOFA/MoU/TA, and acknowledged by the concerned personnel prior the deployment.

NATO CI expertise considered and addressed at the highest level within the chain of command (CoC) may support the effective implementation of the mandate and the creation of clear coordination and interoperability channels with other IOs involved in the matter. Referring strictly to the criminal investigation, knowing in advance the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) capacity is also relevant for the Operational Planning Process (OPP).

Criminal investigations might rely on law enforcement agencies able to

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<sup>11</sup> Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon 19-20 November 2010.

<sup>12</sup> Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002.

<sup>13</sup> NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence Stability Policing Framework Concept for Community Policing in NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction operations, Edition 1, 22 March 2016.

operate under the military chain of command within a fragile environment such as gendarmerie type forces. This type of assets that might perform missions under NATO umbrella can prove their effectiveness in supporting the HN CI capacity depending on the initial setting up of clear functional responsibilities regarding the military CoC and the judicial authority.

Nevertheless, in supporting the overall CI framework within the theatre of operation (ToO), all NATO/national assets involved in any kind of task need to be trained on the basic knowledge of **preserving a crime scene**. According to a Senior Project Leader at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, **battlefield evidence collection is essential**: *“Because of their presence on the battlefield, the military could therefore facilitate the collection of relevant information that can be used as evidence in court in terrorism-related crimes. This could be the national army, a foreign army or UN peacekeeping operations, provided that in the latter two cases, there is an international mandate (such as consent or UN authorisation) that allows the intervention on the territory of the state where the crimes have been committed. The legal and practical constraints, the intensity of the conflict and operational goals of the military will determine to a large extent how far the military can assist in collecting information and evidence from (post) conflict situations”*<sup>14</sup>.

For supporting the HN Criminal Justice Chain in performing the CI tasks, the involved IOs’ require cooperation and coordination for collection of admissible evidence that will foster future arrests.

The roles regarding CI within the Area of Operation (AoO) requires a clear picture concerning competencies amongst different IOs with CI capacity in order to avoid uncoordinated actions that might generate unplanned effects, and make the most out of the mechanisms of international law, including enforcement cooperation and information exchange.

Sensitive topics framed within CI, such as witness protection and correction, require special attention for closing the criminal justice loop.

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<sup>14</sup> Bringing (Foreign) Terrorist Fighters to Justice in a Post-ISIS Landscape Part III: Collecting Evidence from Conflict Situations, Tanya Mehra LL.M - International Centre for Counter-terrorism.

As HN ownership has always been the central idea within any NATO mission, the CI capacity must be seen as a tool to be used in the initial engagement of the SP replacement mission for the eventual transfer of authority. Ideally, the mandate shall address the responsibilities within the CI framework, setting the temporal perspective limits, and the handover / takeover process.

### 3.1.3 CONCLUSIONS

- a. As highlighted also by the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence Stability Policing Framework Concept for Forensics in Stabilization and Reconstruction operations: *“Any broader social and economic advancement requires the re-/establishment of public order and security as essential conditions, which are obtained only involving the collective effort of key contributors including **Law Enforcement, the Judiciary and Corrections.**”*<sup>15</sup>
- b. The management of public safety and order including the investigation of petty and serious crimes has not always been addressed in a comprehensive, coordinated manner by the International Community that supported the HN.
- c. Addressing criminality within a fragile environment is always a challenge from the military perspective and requires a specialized approach. The NATO Stability Policing CI Task is very likely to be seen as an indispensable ability in support of reaching stability.
- d. NATO Stability Policing CI capacities can assist the military aspect of the mission by contributing to civil military cooperation (CIMIC), force protection (FP), counterinsurgency, reducing risk and ensuring a safe and secure environment (SASE). It can be considered as a tool for a smoother transition to Host Nation police forces or international civil police missions.
- e. There is a need for the assessment of the supported HN criminal investigation to incorporate:
  - historical and current criminal investigation capacity, looking at the Host Nation Police Force (HNPF) together with other criminal justice

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<sup>15</sup> NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence Stability Policing Framework Concept for Stabilization and Reconstruction operations, Edition 1, 22 March 2016.

- components, such as prosecutors, courts, and the correctional system;
- local juridical framework taking into account social, cultural, religious, and ethnic elements.
- f. Based on a thorough assessment, the creation of benchmarks within criminal investigations framework can help the planners to understand the mission horizon. Focussed towards a HN ownership, the mandate shall address the responsibilities within the CI framework, setting the temporal perspective limits, and the handover / takeover process.
- g. As a first mover within the ToO, NATO's intervention capacity requires a CI mandated capacity to be coordinated amongst different involved IOs. Therefore, there is a need for the executive mandate and the cooperation within the CI framework to be **stated clearly** within the **UN resolution /SOFA/MoU/TA**.
- h. The effectiveness of NATO assets in supporting the HN CI capacity relies on setting clear functional responsibilities regarding the **military CoC** and **the judicial authority** right from the outset.
- i. All NATO/national assets involved in the mission need to be trained on the basic knowledge on preserving crime scene, effectively ensuring a proper battlefield evidence collection.
- j. The involvement of different IOs for supporting the HN in CI is to be tailored to the requirements needed to tackle existing risks. Uncoordinated actions among IOs that possess CI capacity might generate unforeseen effects.
- k. NATO, as part of the IC, needs to be prepared to mitigate shortfalls regarding CI capacity in areas such as personnel, logistics, and finance.
- l. The ideal situation is to address replacement and reinforcement missions concurrently. If this is not possible regarding CI capacity of the HN, there must be a coordinated approach between the two SP missions.
- m. Collection of lessons identified, lessons learned, best practices (BPs) from different ToO within the CI framework is essential.
- n. Crimes against humanity require special attention and need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner by other international judiciary authorities on a case-by-case approach.

### 3.1.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. The International community and NATO should consider the CI-SP task as an effective tool for:
  - ensuring the protection of civilians and Human Rights;
  - contributing to reach SASE;
  - increasing civil military cooperation and contribution to Force Protection;
  - addressing Counter Insurgency and Terrorism;
  - increasing NATO and HNPF accountability;
  - ensuring a smoother transition to Host Nation Police Forces or International Civil Police missions.
- b. Criminal Investigation capacities in both replacement and reinforcement missions should be streamlined and coordinated with other International Organisations to make them cost/effective. Specialized gendarmerie type forces can achieve this tasks under either the NATO, UN, or EU umbrellas.
- c. Fact-finding missions shall address the CI capacity of the HN in order to predict a potential SP replacement or reinforcement mission. In either way, the IC and the NATO involvement through the SP component within the CI framework shall be based on a thorough assessment referring to:
  - National/transnational criminality, scale and nature of violence and human rights component;
  - Juridical framework correlated and interpreted within the key of International Humanitarian Law and local social, cultural, religious, and ethnic elements;
  - Historical and current criminal justice components (Host Nation Police Force, prosecutors, courts, and the correctional system);
  - Gaps in terms of structure, strength, education, training, national and international judicial interoperability;
  - The required capacity to address the human rights dimension of criminal investigation and prosecution of complex crimes.
- d. The limit of the executive mandate and cooperation within the CI framework should be clearly stated within the UN resolution /SOFA/MoU/TA.

Consequently, the NATO SP CI task should be clearly mandated and coordinated, in order to:

- Be reflected within the CONOPS and the OPLAN;
  - Empower the concerned assets with executive police powers to include the use of force, as well as the power of search and arrest;
  - Ensure appropriate mechanisms of coordination with the local judicial and correctional systems;
  - Allow as soon as possible transition to the HN structures.
- e. CI field of expertise requires specific planning considerations, such as:
- The international component to support/replace the HN CI capacity shall be calibrated based on the fact-finding mission regarding its competencies and needs (structure, specialized forces, logistics, and financial implications);
  - Assessment of the legal international and domestic law applicable in case of a replacement mission;
  - The means to deploy an international legal capacity at the domestic level, considering also the establishment of a hybrid court<sup>16</sup>;
  - Establish when necessary additional agreements for mission support with the host country and with third nations (e.g. handover of suspected criminals, handling and prosecution of suspected pirates, etc.)<sup>17</sup>;
  - Clear physical and territorial responsibilities within the CI framework for all international assets involved;
  - The creation of benchmarks can support the efficiency of criminal investigations and can help planners to understand the mission's horizon;
  - All planning activities shall be HN ownership focused.
- f. Responsibilities such as establishing the tasking authority and the reporting process regarding CI within the ToO must be clearly established in respect to military CoC and the functional subordination to the criminal justice component in line with the mission's objectives.

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<sup>16</sup> Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Rule of Law tools for post-conflict States, maximizing the legacy of hybrid courts, 2008.

<sup>17</sup> Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD).

- g. NATO shall interact with those international police and justice components that addressed criminality in different ToOs in order to collect observations, lessons identified, lessons learned, and best practices within the law enforcement and CI framework.
- h. Based on the LL/BPs, the IC shall really facilitate future assignment regarding the support to the HNCl capacity by:
  - creation of common internationally agreed standards and working procedures;
  - benchmarking, so that the transfer of authority can be condition based;
  - Updating the NATO doctrine with the appropriate terminology regarding CI.
- i. All NATO/national assets involved in the mission need to be trained on the basic knowledge on preserving crime scene, therefore ensuring a proper battlefield evidence collection. In this regard, the NATO SP COE annual domestic course is strongly recommended.
- j. Transition to the HN ownership in terms of CI capacity shall be generally framed by:
  - the ideal situation to address concurrently the replacement and reinforcement missions. If this is not possible, there must be at least a coordinated approach between the two SP missions;
  - an appropriate capacity of the HNPF to address the criminality;
  - a dedicated plan developed by the International Police components to further assist HNPF in terms of CI.
- k. Crimes against humanity require special attention and need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner by competent, specialised international judiciary authorities, on a case-by-case approach. Whether required, the SP component could bring its specialised contribution.



## 3.2 STABILITY POLICING REINFORCEMENT MISSIONS

The expected outcome was to understand if NATO could support the Host Nation Police Force in building its Criminal Investigation capacity through a SP reinforcement mission.

### 3.2.1 OBSERVATION

NATO forces witnessed and had to deal with both serious and petty crimes because of a security vacuum and a lack of CI capacity (no/weak police force and inefficient judicial system); therefore, if mandated, NATO may have contributed in the initial phase to the International Community (IC) efforts in building the HNPF CI capacity.

### 3.2.2 DISCUSSION

The CI capacity of the HN contributes to the security of the civilian population and the government's legitimacy, enabling a culture of lawfulness, social stability, and economic reconstruction.

As proven in the past, there can be many contributors to HN Police capacity-building missions, such as NATO, UN, EU, OSCE, AU, and other partners. Building the HN capacity to ensure a safe and secure environment is not possible without having a functioning rule of law system based on solid criminal justice.

This is a difficult challenge for unstable states<sup>18</sup> and their partners as well. To achieve a safe and secure environment, domestic efforts should be coordinated among different actors such as lawmakers, police, prosecutors, judges, correction officials, and other justice sector stakeholders within the rule of law framework. Providing assistance and training in a comprehensive and coordinated manner to all these stakeholders is essential and a key factor to be considered by the IC in reaching the End State<sup>19</sup>. Often, NATO planning process did not address this precisely and in a comprehensive manner, specifically looking to HN law enforcement.

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<sup>18</sup> NATO Standard AJP-3.22 Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing, Edition A Version 1, July 2016.

<sup>19</sup> The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved (NATO agreed).

Even though NATO's primary role is to stabilize and, subsequently, replace the HNPF in case of need, it can also support the international police organizations' efforts to build the HNPF CI capacity. This can be achieved by engaging gendarmerie type forces through the Stability Policing capability, in order to perform activities such as training, monitoring, evaluating, advising, mentoring, partnering, and reforming. This approach proves timely and effective in building the CI capacity, if it is specifically mandated.

Regardless of the local context, the international community in support of the HN needs to operate on valid guiding principles. Based on the rule of law definition, the UN sets measuring indicators on criminal justice institutions, including the police and other law enforcement agencies, the courts, the prosecution and the defence, and corrections: *"They focus on their capacity, performance, integrity, transparency and accountability. They also monitor how vulnerable social groups are treated by these institutions"*<sup>20</sup>.

Based on these guiding principles, a specific NATO training command may be involved in assessing the HN for understanding the stability policing reinforcement mission key factors, looking as well at the cooperation channels and capacity of prosecutors, courts and correctional system.

Primarily, this implies the involvement and cooperation of the HN through the relevant national authorities, in order to achieve local ownership as soon as possible, as the *"Legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population rather than by the externally imposed criteria."*<sup>21</sup>

As the well-being of the local population shall be the focus for any mission, the doctrine for the military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction frames this end-state objective, referring to safe and secure environment (SASE): *"In a SASE, the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of persistent or large-scale violence. Such an environment is characterized by a local norm of public order, physical security, territorial security, a state monopoly on violence and protection of civilians."*<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators, 2011.

<sup>21</sup> NATO STANDARD – AJP 3.22, Allied Joint Doctrine for stability policing, Edition A, July 2016.

<sup>22</sup> NATO Standard AJP-3.4.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for the military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction, edition A Version 1, December 2015.

The same doctrinal publication mentions that “A SASE allows other S&R activities to proceed”. Therefore, looking specifically at the building of HN CI capacity, there must be a system of cooperation or transfer of knowledge between the replacement and reinforcement components of the mission.

Tackling criminality is essential for the HN in order to establish the basis for human, social and economic development. It requires a strong criminal justice response that includes effective enforcement in order to bring criminals and criminal organizations to justice. Addressing criminality may be hampered by:

- legislative gaps and parallel justice systems;
- corruption and political influence as general spoiler threats risks;
- lack of a critical number of criminal investigation practitioners or at least insufficient resources that will hamper the creation of a specialised criminal investigation capacity;
- inefficient information gathering systems and the lack of capacities to analyse and consequently insufficient information and intelligence sharing among countries of the same region and with international criminal police organizations;
- disrupted criminal justice chain (police - prosecution service - courts - correction);
- lack of experience in investigating complex crimes such as transnational organised crime or in addressing sensitive social topics such as violence against vulnerable groups (children and women) trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, forced labour, cultural protection;
- lack of equipment and facilities required to support CI.

It is essential that CI training should be carried out in a comprehensive manner with prosecutorial and judicial elements. If the aforementioned are not addressed, the HN will fail to prevent, detect, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate criminal cases, therefore will risk losing the trust of the local population. The ultimate goal of such efforts is to maintain or return to a stable, self-sustaining state.

### 3.2.3 CONCLUSIONS

- a. It is essential that the International Community (NATO, UN, EU, OSCE, AU, and other partners) together with the HN consider building a proper Criminal Investigation capacity, as an enabler to reach a SASE.
- b. IOs involved in reinforcement of the HN Police CI capacity need to be coordinated and interoperable in order to avoid uncoordinated actions that might generate unplanned effects. If they are not, the crisis resolution would be impossible to predict and long-term IC commitment would be necessary, which may generate higher costs.
- c. NATO may contribute to the efforts undertaken by the International Community (IC) in building the Host Nation Police Forces (HNPF) CI capacity. This can be accomplished by specialised NATO forces who possess the knowledge and skills to undertake this task (i.e. Gendarmerie-Type forces, Military Police), developed by carrying out similar tasks in their countries of origin. These assets have the capacity of surviving in hostile environments and they can either replace Host Nation Police Forces (when either not existing or unable/unwilling to execute their duties) or reinforce them through training, mentoring, monitoring, advising, partnering and reforming, raising their standards of efficiency and effectiveness to an acceptable level.
- d. The international mandates do not always consider providing assistance and training in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. Because of this, the NATO planning process does not address precisely and in a comprehensive manner the lines of effort to give the HN strength and legitimacy as soon as possible, specifically looking at building law enforcement and CI capacity.
- e. The desired End State of a SP reinforcement mission, specifically addressing CI, should be the existence of a nation-wide, professional CI structure for the HN, which possesses the ability operate independently.
- f. For an effective follow up and implementation of the mandate, the establishment of a NATO training command for assessing the HN needs is required to understand the stability policing reinforcement mission key factors.
- g. Experiences collected during the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE missions regarding the support offered to build/reform HNPFs are valuable, especially for:

- Assessing the risks generated by spoiler threats such as corruption and political influence in relation to building a real CI capacity;
- coping with legislative gaps and parallel justice systems;
- understanding previous gaps in educating, training, mentoring, monitoring and advising HNPF in tight relation with the other components of the criminal justice system (police - prosecution service - courts - correction);
- evaluating the HNPF to ensure evidence based improved capability within the CI framework.

### 3.2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. International Actors (NATO, UN, EU, OSCE, AU, and other partners) must include building a proper Criminal Investigation capacity on their priority list in order to be able to reach a SASE for the benefit of the HN, and for reaching the Missions End State.
- b. The efforts of IOs to reinforce the Host Nation police CI capacity need to be streamlined to avoid unplanned effects. If they are not, the crisis resolution could become unpredictable and long-term IC commitment would be necessary, which may generate higher costs.
- c. NATO shall contribute to the International Community (IC) efforts in building the HNPF CI capacity through specialised NATO forces who possess the knowledge and skills to undertake this task (i.e. Gendarmerie-Type forces, Military Police), developed by carrying out similar tasks in their countries of origin.
- d. Whether mandated, the NATO planning process shall assess the option of including a specific Police training command, in order to be able to address in a comprehensive and coordinated manner the building of HN law enforcement and specifically - CI capacity.
- e. All the experiences collected during the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE missions regarding the support offered to build/reform HNPFs shall be shared among IOs, especially for understanding how to:
  - deploy the appropriate international police forces, capable of performing missions in hostile environments and able to contribute to the building of the HN law enforcement;

- assess the risks generated by spoiler threats like corruption and political influence in relation to building a real CI capacity;
- cope with legislative gaps and parallel justice system, and strongly promote local accountability;
- advise the HN in the process of creation of a multiethnic police force, with an appropriate gender perspective;
- appreciate previous gaps and/or best practices in educating, training, mentoring, monitoring and advising HNPF in strong relation with the other components of the criminal justice system (police - prosecution service - courts - correction);
- create a comprehensive training curricula and tools for delivering specialized training courses to strengthen the investigative and prosecutorial capacity to detect and address domestic and transnational criminal cases;
- evaluate HNPF in order to ensure evidence based improved capability within the CI framework;
- to ensure that the HNPF is trained to the same minimum standards across the HN;
- plan for an exit strategy and transfer institutional knowledge of CI to the transitional authority;
- adapt the capabilities owned by the different IOs, through supporting future doctrinal developments, training and planning of operations.

## CHAPTER 4

The expected outcome was to develop an organisational chart for a Stability Policing Unit, able to operate in future NATO Missions (replacement or/and reinforcement mandate).

The Syndicate discussions and analysis have focused on the current organizational models of the existing NATO – Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), UN-Formed

Police Unit (FPU), EU – Formed Police Unit (FPU)/Integrated Police Unit (IPU) and EGF- Formed Police Unit (FPU)/Integrated Police Unit (IPU), usually deployed by these IOs for performing Stability Policing tasks in different theatres of operations.

Based on those models, best practices from the experiences of group members have been considered in the process of identifying the most appropriate structures for the proposed NATO Stability Policing Units.

### 4.1 OBSERVATION

Stability Policing is a concept described in the NATO AJP 3 Doctrinal series, and defined as *a set of police related activities for the restoration and/or upholding of the public order, security and rule of law as well as the protection of human rights through supporting and, when necessary, temporarily replacing the indigenous police forces, when the latter are either unable or unwilling to perform the function themselves* (according to the NATO AJP-3.22)<sup>23</sup>.

Stability Policing stems from the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) experience, deployed for the first time in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1998 within NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR). This unit, with a force strength of a regiment, consisted of gendarmerie type forces and military police units,

### SYNDICATE #4

*“The most appropriate structure of the Stability Policing Unit following the organizational models of the existing NATO – Multinational Specialized Unit, UN-Formed Police Unit, EU – Formed Police Unit /Integrated Police Unit and EGF- Integrated Police Unit/ Formed Police Unit”.*

<sup>23</sup> <http://www.nspcoe.org/about-us/what's-sp>.



operating directly under command and control of the commander of the NATO Mission deployed in the theatre of operations<sup>24</sup>.

The MSU has been carrying out civil police duties including crowd and riot control and public security activities, focused on the civilian population, employed minimum force operating in a small unit to accomplish their tasks. This model was also deployed in Kosovo within the KFOR, where it is still operating under COMKFOR's OPCOM<sup>25</sup>.

After the experience of the NATO MSUs in the Balkans, the United Nations and European Union created and developed their own doctrine for deploying police units in a complex fragile environment or during crisis response operations performed by United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and even EUROGENDFOR (EGF). These units are called Formed Police Units and Integrated Police Units, depending on their required capabilities and tasks.

## 4.2 DISCUSSION

The MSU Regiments' points of strength was their modularity, flexibility of use and the ability to operate in small units, if needed. These features showed the MSU as a very valuable resource for NATO, both from the operational and the intelligence-led policing perspectives. The regiment had a "robust" police structure, in which all the components were trained and equipped to operate in unstable areas, capable to perform different levels of police tasks.

The current MSU Regiment deployed in Kosovo is part of NATO KFOR's assets. MSU provides COM KFOR with a capability for security operations including criminal intelligence, crowd and riot control (CRC) as well as information gathering and threat assessments. The MSU can also provide advice, training, and support local police forces on a wide range of policing issues if required, including: law enforcement, combating organized crime and terrorism, war crime investigation, crime prevention and public security.

Currently, KFOR MSU has a regiment-level force strength, with a commander's core staff divided in small cells (personnel, information, operations, logistic, communication, budgeting/finance and CIMIC), one battalion with two companies, one medical section (ROL1 level) and one logistic

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<sup>24</sup> <http://www.nspcoe.org/about-us/history/nato-sp-coe>

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.nato.int/sfor/factsheet/msu/t040809a.htm>

support unit. MSU is also providing two liaison officers to KFOR Joint Operational Centre (JOC) and to the Kosovo Police HQs. The minimum force strength of this structure is approximately 140 PAX. Moreover, the MSU Commander is an advisor of COMKFOR<sup>26</sup> for civil police issues.

The United Nations created their specific asset for performing stability policing tasks under UN Mandate. This asset is called Formed Police Unit<sup>27</sup> (UN FPU) and it consists of approximately 160/200 police officers, trained and equipped to act as a cohesive unit capable of accomplishing policing tasks that individual police officers cannot address. Well-trained FPU can operate even in “high-risk” environments.

This unit is defined “*armed mobile police unit*”, providing security support to United Nations operations by ensuring the safety and assets of United Nations personnel and missions, primarily in public order management. According to the UN Policy on “Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (ref. 2016.10 dated 01/01/2017) the core functions of this unit are:

- *“Protection of UN personnel and property;*
- *Contribution to the Protection of Civilians;*
- *Contribution to police operations that require a formed response or specialized capacities above the capability of individual police officers;*
- *Capacity building is not a core function, however if a FPU has dedicated training capabilities and the operational situation allows, it may support programs in the development of the host state police, mainly in the area of public order management”.*

The main characteristics of the FPUs are the following:

- *fully self-sufficient and mobile police unit of 160 members (may vary from 160-200 members);*
- *normally formed entirely from one contingent;*
- *self-sustained with unit integrity and equipment;*

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<sup>26</sup> <https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/units/msu>.

<sup>27</sup> The UN definition about FPU is the following: a specialized, cohesive, armed mobile police unit, providing security support to United Nations operations by ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and assets; contributing to the protection of civilians; and supporting police operations that require a formed response. Depending on the mandate, FPUs may perform these tasks independently (in the case of executive law enforcement mandate) or in support of existing host-State law enforcement agencies and within the limits of their operational and logistical capabilities, areas of deployment and relevant UN policies.

- *responsive to situations of security, law and order challenges;*
- *“on call” to assist other UNPOL components in the development of capacity building for local police when necessary.*

The FPU is structured as one executive component (with four operational platoons), command, operation component and logistic support as needed according to the mission mandate, and one medical unit (Level 1).

The need to coordinate and efficiently interact when in the same area of responsibility (AoR) there are different international organizations dealing with the same local institutions (Host Nation Police, local government, etc.) has been highlighted. For this reason, a mutually supportive operation should be considered when in the AoR different international organizations (UN, NATO, EU, AU) are operating<sup>28</sup>.

Following the same path, the European Union requires that EU Member States have the necessary police capabilities to take on the stability policing functions in which the Members State can contribute with the “Integrated Police Units” (IPUs) and the “Formed Police Units” (FPUs)<sup>29</sup>.

IPU and FPU<sup>30</sup> are specifically designed to conduct within EU missions executive police tasks in a large spectrum of policing activities<sup>31</sup> (*strengthening or/and substitution mandates, similar to the NATO Stability Policing reinforcement or/and replacement missions*).

In detail, IPU is a police unit that meets the following conditions, according to the Concept for Rapid Deployment of Police Elements in an EU-led Substitution Mission<sup>32</sup>:

- *robust, rapidly deployable, flexible and interoperable forces*<sup>33</sup>;

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<sup>28</sup> Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations. United Nations DPO, DFS ref. 2016.10.

<sup>29</sup> [https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXIV/EU/08/85/EU\\_88597/imfname\\_10037428.pdf](https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXIV/EU/08/85/EU_88597/imfname_10037428.pdf)

<sup>30</sup> Comprehensive concept for police substitution missions" sets out that formed police units are those units, which either cannot be placed under military responsibility or cannot be deployed in non-stabilised situations. These units can be constituted by integrating several smaller size units of the same member state.

<sup>31</sup> Concept for rapid deployment of police elements in an EU-led substitution mission #8508/02/05 REV2 EXT2 dated 19.02.2012.

<sup>32</sup> EU Concept for rapid deployment of police elements in an EU-led substitution mission, Council of the European Union, 8502/2/05 rev. 19.07.2012.

<sup>33</sup> **Robust:** IPUs should be provided with weaponry and equipment (some heavy equipment can also be used) to enable them to operate with appropriate self-protection and security conditions in non-stabilised situations. **Rapidly Deployable:** they should if possible be able to deploy within 30 days. A rapidly deployable EUPOL HQ will be essential for this deployment. These units should have an adequate logistic capability according to the tasks related to the mission (and specified in the CONOPS), and will bring their organic equipment. **Flexible:** they should be able

- *able to perform police executive tasks;*
- *preferably (to be deployed) in non-stabilised situations;*
- *in case of an EU operation including military forces, subject to their national rules and legislation, may be placed temporarily under the responsibility of the military authority entrusted with the protection of the population.*

In order to meet the above conditions, the IPU must possess the following characteristics: structured and existing unit, with its own chain of command, possessing common Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTP) and training, able to perform different police tasks, capable of self-protection in performing standard police operations.

Moreover, IPU must satisfy the following technical aspects: availability of logistics, personnel/unit equipment, and some heavy equipment (if needed).

The IPU can perform a large spectrum of police functions as mentioned in the "substitution mission" scenario, such as:

- *Patrolling and public surveillance operations;*
- *Information gathering;*
- *Public order, civil disorder, riot and crowd control functions;*
- *Without prejudice to the activities to be carried out by specialised units, they may carry out other police functions and tasks such as: to conduct criminal investigations; to investigate major crimes against human rights, assistance to refugees and internal displaced persons - IDP; to provide support to the International Criminal Courts or Tribunals; to ensure, if needed, other police functions such as traffic police and border policing; to provide assistance for security of personnel involved in missions in the area, both from the EU and from the international community; to perform security tasks such as close protection and VIP escorts.*

Regarding the Formed Police Unit, *which is deployed only under civilian responsibility*, according to the Concept for Rapid Deployment of Police Elements in an EU-led Substitution Mission<sup>34</sup>, *it could be defined as a police unit that can be constituted by integrating several smaller sized units, from one or*

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to perform different tasks by adapting their elements to new situations. **Interoperable:** they should be interoperable among themselves and with other Police Elements.

<sup>34</sup> EU Concept for rapid deployment of police elements in an EU-led substitution mission, Council of the European Union, 8502/2/05 rev. 19.07.2012.

*more Member States.*

*These units should be rapidly deployable, flexible, interoperable and able to perform executive police tasks.*

*To meet the above conditions an FPU must possess the following characteristics:*

- police units with common TTP's and training;*
- availability of operational equipment and weapons;*
- pre-deployment formed police units, identified by Member States, provided with appropriate self-protection capability can be deployed in non-stabilised situations.*

According to the mandate, an FPU can perform police functions as mentioned in the "substitution mission" scenario, i.e.:

- patrolling and public surveillance operations;*
- information gathering;*
- public order, riot and crowd control functions;*
- without prejudice to activities to be carried out by specialised units, they may carry out other police functions and tasking such as: to ensure, if needed, other police functions such as traffic police and border policing; to provide assistance to refugees and internal displaced persons - IDP; to provide assistance for security of personnel involved in missions in the area, both from the EU and from the international community; to perform security tasks such as close protection and VIP escorts, etc.*

In addition, it was acknowledged that, subject to their national rules and legislation, some police components may be placed temporarily under the responsibility of the military authority entrusted with the protection of the population.

The EU IPU/FPU organizational chart considers the following primary elements:

- the staff elements of the IPU Commander<sup>35</sup>;*
- the operational element, in charge of patrolling the territory by means of public order and other policing duties;*

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<sup>35</sup> <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jul/eu-eeas-2014-eurogendfor.pdf>

- the logistic element tailored in accordance with the logistic functions it has to undertake. It should be composed of all the units responsible for the management, administration, control and medical assistance, and with whatever the police mission needs to carry out its assigned tasks.

In terms of deployment, an initial mission strength of 300 police officers could be foreseen.

Similarly, the European Gendarmerie Force<sup>36</sup> (EGF) can be considered as a stability policing tool<sup>37</sup> designed to carry out police missions in different theatres of operations, including destabilized ones, in support of the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or possible *ad-hoc* coalitions.

Based on the mandate, EGF can deploy IPU or FPU units, as a specific response to the emerging challenges that the international community is facing in the framework of crisis management, in both conflict and post-conflict situations. EGF can provide an added value to crisis management operations, due to:

- *rapid reaction capability by deploying up to 800 police officers within 30 days, including robust police units. The deployment of IPU, especially in the first stage of a crisis management operations - generally the most critical – is essential to overcome the so called “security and deployment” gap, period of time during which the military are responsible for typical police tasks, generally before the deployment of an effective international police presence;*
- *rapid planning capacity provided by the PHQ, full time committed to plan and conduct the rapid deployment of EGF forces;*
- *possibility to act under both civilian and military chains of command and even to ensure a seamless transition from military to civilian primacy in crisis management operations;*

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<sup>36</sup> The European Gendarmerie Force is a multinational initiative made up of seven Member States - France, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain - established by the Treaty of Velsen.

<sup>37</sup> Eu-council-eeas-police-units-questionnaire-9973-13.pdf

- *gendarmerie forces have some military skills and robust equipment that allows them to act in destabilized environments performing police tasks from the very outset of a crisis.*
- *capability to operate in a non-benign environment due to the robustness of its assets that allow them to be deployed in destabilized environments from the outset of the crisis;*
- *improved interoperability due to common training, similar methodology of planning and doctrinal concepts;*
- *experience related to involvement of the seven EGF participating forces in a wide range of crisis management operations over the last years, especially in the most robust ones<sup>38</sup>.*

The EGF's FPU/IPUs engaged in EU missions have the same organisational chart. The particularity of the FPU regards the force composition and C2 structure consisting of 100 PAX as minimum force strength and the possibility to have six or seven individual police officers assigned for a specific task.

Summarizing, the main differences between the EU IPU and FPU are the following:

- IPU can be placed under military responsibility while the FPU cannot;
- IPU can carry out a wide range of police tasks while the FPU has a limited range of tasks, mainly public order and general patrolling;
- IPU can be used in a non-stabilised situation (initial stage) while the FPU will not normally be used in such situations;
- IPU can be self-sufficient for the logistical aspects and can be provided with heavy equipment – it can provide logistical support to the FPU;
- to the IPU can be assigned an area of responsibility because the unit can perform a full range of police tasks while the FPU cannot perform all of them.

### 4.3 CONCLUSIONS

Considering the structures mentioned in the previous paragraphs, deployable under UN, EU and NATO umbrellas, there was a consensus on

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<sup>38</sup> <http://www.eurogendfor.org/organisation/what-is-eurogendfor>



identifying a possible NATO Stability Policing Unit model. The latter can be scaled, according to its tasks, composition and on the possibility to be employed as a stand-alone entity or integrated into a larger NATO Mission. The identified model, however, should not represent a final structure but should serve as a start point for a dedicated NATO Workshop or study aimed at comprehensively analysing the specific requirements of a Stability Policing Unit Structure.

The NATO Stability Policing Unit (SPU) based on a modular structure and adaptable to both possible scenarios (**reinforcement and replacement missions**), should be similar to the KFOR MSU and UN/EU FPU models, and its main structure should include, in its simpler form:

- a Commander and his/her staff, coordinated by a chief of staff;
- Specialized Elements (for specific civil police tasks) in accordance with the Mission's requirements;
- Monitoring, Mentoring, Advising, Reforming & Partnering Elements<sup>39</sup> (consistent with the reinforcement tasks that could include also training activities);
- Operational/Mobile Elements (main focus on public order management and crowd and riot control activities);
- Logistic, technical and (if needed) medical Support;
- a CIMIC element, if required.

In its more complex configuration, it could include Liaison Officers from other International Organisations and Host Nations authorities.

The need to have SP SMEs embedded in the NATO Task Force HQ has also been highlighted as an important conclusion.

The level of the SPU should be scaled according to both mandated tasks and operational needs, and therefore, in principle, range from a Battalion to a

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<sup>39</sup> **Monitoring:** consists of observing, assessing and reporting (to the competent authority) on the performance of indigenous police forces, in order to ensure compliance with the human rights and best international police practices. **Mentoring:** activities assisting the Host Nation by providing continuous guidance and counsel to specific individuals, teams or units until they are capable to function independently. Mentoring is normally focused on developing personnel in leadership and command positions (see NATO AJP 3.22). **Advising:** activities assisting the Host nation by providing subject matter expertise and advice to local forces. Advising activities are applicable from the tactical to the strategic level and in support of individuals or groups. **Reforming:** Consists of driving, supporting and favouring a strategic transformation process aimed at enhancing capacities and integrity at both institutional and individual levels. All these terms are defined in the NATO AJP 3.22.

Brigade, nevertheless it should consist of a minimum of 160 officers.

In addition, in line with NATO operational requirements (Combined Joint Statement of Requirements), it needs to be:

- deployable and staffed adequately, fully in line with NATO standards;
- self-sustainable;
- capable to support the transition to a Police component, to be placed under the civilian chain of command of a different International Organisation.

#### 4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

In line with the above-mentioned conclusions, the following structure is recommended for the NATO Stability Policing Unit (SPU), deployable in both possible scenarios (*reinforcement and replacement*).

The SPU should include:

- a Commander and his/her staff, led by the chief of staff, composed of the following cells:
  - ✓ Personnel;
  - ✓ Intelligence-led Stability Policing;
  - ✓ Operations/Planning/Training/Liaison Officers team and a Tactical Operational Centre;
  - ✓ Logistic/Medical Assistance (ROLE1 level) and CIS;
  - ✓ BUDFIN;
  - ✓ CIMIC (optional);
- the Police Capacity Building Branch. The aim of this branch is to plan and coordinate all the MMAR&P<sup>40</sup> activities, but also training<sup>41</sup> programs related to the development of the Host National Police Force (HNPF) capacity.
- the Operational/Mobile Elements, under the command of the SPU's CDR will consist of a police unit, at company level, composed of:
  - ✓ Company CDR;
  - ✓ CDR's staff elements;
  - ✓ 4 platoons.

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<sup>40</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>41</sup> This includes all initiatives that contribute to education and training of the local force, both at the individual and collective level. A comprehensive training program should align with all stakeholders to ensure a coordinated approach.

- the Logistic Support Unit under command and control of the SP commander.
- Monitoring, mentoring, advising, reforming and partnering Elements should plan and coordinate all training activities with the Police Capacity Building Branch.
- an adequate number of Specialized Elements (i.e. organised crime investigations, environmental crime, forensic, SWAT) in accordance with the required police tasks.

The level of the SPU will be defined according to the NATO mandate, tasks and operational needs (ranging from Battalion to Brigade level) and should be capable to support the transition to a Police component, to be placed under the civilian chain of command of a different International Organisation. Anyway, a minimum level of 160 police officers for an SPU was considered optimal. It is also recommended to insert SP SMEs within the NATO TF HQs. The Charts in Annex “A” and “B” reflect the possible structure of a SPU whether it is a stand-alone entity or whether it is included in the wider structure of a NATO Mission, and can serve as a starting point for a future NATO WS or study.

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## ACRONYMS LIST

No.	Acronym	Meaning
1)	ACO	Allied Command Operations
2)	ACT	Allied Command Transformation
3)	AFG	Afghan
4)	AJDA	Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture
5)	AJP	Allied Joint Publication
6)	ANP	Afghan National Police
7)	ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
8)	AoO	Area of Operation
9)	AOR	Area of Responsibility
10)	ATP	Allied Tactical Publication
11)	AU	African Union
12)	AU-FPU	African Union-Formed Police Units
13)	Bi-SC	Of the two Strategic Commands (ACT and ACO)
14)	BP(s)	Best Practise(s)
15)	BUDFIN	Budget and Finance
16)	C2	Command and Control
17)	C3	Command, Control and Communications
18)	CC&S	Capability Codes and Capability Statements
19)	CDR	Commander
20)	CI	Criminal Investigations
21)	CIMIC	Civil military cooperation
22)	CISE	Common Information Sharing Environment
23)	CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
24)	CNs	Contributing Nations
25)	CoA	Course of actions
26)	CoC	Chain of Command
27)	COE	Centre of Excellence
28)	COESPU	Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units
29)	COI	Community of Interest
30)	COMSPF	Commander Stability policing Forces
31)	COMSPU	Commander Stability Police Units
32)	COMKFOR	Commander of Kosovo Force
33)	COM MSU	Commander Multinational Specialized Units
34)	COMTAAC-WEST	Train Advise Assist Command
35)	CONOPS	Concept of Operations
36)	COPD	Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
37)	COS	Chief of Staff
38)	COY	Company
39)	CPP	Cultural Property Protection
40)	CRC	Crowd and Riot Control
41)	CREVAL	Combat Readiness Evaluation
42)	CULAD	Cultural Advisor

43)	Db	Data-base
44)	DOTMLFP-I	Doctrine–Organizations–Training–Materiel–Leadership–Personnel-Facilities-Interoperability
45)	DPKO	UN Department peace keeping operations
46)	EEAS	European External Action Service
47)	EEAS-CPCC	European External Action Service- Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
48)	EAAS-CMPD	European External Action Service- Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
49)	EGF	European Gendarmerie Force
50)	EGF-IPU	European Gendarmerie Force – Integrated Police Units
51)	EU	European Union
52)	EU-FPU/IPU	European Union Formed Police Units and Integrated Police Units
53)	EUPOL	European Union Police
54)	EUROGENDFOR	European Gendarmerie Force
55)	FOC	Full Operational Capability
56)	FP	Force Protection
57)	FPU	Formed Police Units
58)	GENAD	Gender Advisor
59)	HN	Host Nation
60)	HNCI	Host Nation Criminal Investigation
61)	HNPfF	Host Nation Police Forces
62)	HQs	Headquarters
63)	IC	International Community
64)	ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
65)	ICC	International Criminal Court
66)	IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
67)	IHL	International Humanitarian Law
68)	IMS	International Military Staff
69)	IOs	International Organisations
70)	IPF	Indigenous Police Forces
71)	IPU	Integrated Police Units
72)	IS	International Staff
73)	ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
74)	ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
75)	IT	Information Technology
76)	HOTO	Hand Over Take Over
77)	J5	Plan and Policy Office
78)	JALLC	Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
79)	JAR	Joint Analysis Report
80)	JFC-B	Joint Force Command-Brunssum
81)	JFC-N	Joint Force Command-Naples
82)	JOC	Joint Operational Command/Centre
83)	KFOR	Kosovo Force
84)	LCC	Land Component Command
85)	LEGAD	Legal Advisor
86)	LI	Lesson Identified



87)	LL	Lessons Learned
88)	LCC	Land Component Command
89)	LoOs	Lines of operations
90)	MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
91)	MMAR&P	Mentoring, Monitoring, Advising, Reforming and Partnering
92)	MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
93)	MP	Military Police
94)	MSU	Multinational Specialized Unit
95)	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
96)	NRDC	NATO Rapid Deployment Corps
97)	NSPCOE	NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence
98)	NGOs	Non – Governmental Organisations
99)	OBS(s)	Observation(s)
100)	OLRT	Operational Liaison Reconnaissance Team
101)	OPCOM	Operational Commander
102)	OPCON	Operational Control
103)	OPLAN	Operations Plan
104)	OPP	Operational Planning Process
105)	OPS	Operations
106)	OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
107)	PAO	Public Affairs Officer
108)	PAtG	Partners across the globe
109)	PfP	Partnership for Peace
110)	PMO	Provost Marshall Office
111)	POLAD	Political Advisor
112)	RoE	Rule of Engagement
113)	RoL	Rule of Law
114)	RSM-A	Resolute Support Mission-Afghanistan
115)	RUF	Rule for the use of force
116)	SACT	Supreme Allied Command of Transformation
117)	S&R	Stabilization and Reconstruction
118)	SAG	Special Advisory Group/Staff Advisory Group
119)	SASE	Security and Safety Environment
120)	SAT	System Approach to Training
121)	SETAF	Southern European Task Force
122)	SFA	Strategic Foresight Analysis/ Security Force Assistance
123)	SFOR	Stabilization Force (Bosnia Herzegovina)
124)	SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
125)	ShPo	Share Point
126)	SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
127)	SME	Subject Matter Expert
128)	SOF	Special Operations Forces
129)	SoFA	Status of Force Agreement
130)	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
131)	SP	Stability Policing
132)	SPA	Stability Policing Asset

133)	SPCC	SP Component Command
134)	SPF	Stability Policing Forces
135)	SPU	Stability Policing Unit
136)	SWAT	Special Weapon Armoured Team
137)	TA	Treaty Agreement
138)	TACOM	Tactical Command
139)	TACON	Tactical Control
140)	ToO	Theatre of Operations
141)	TCN	Troop Contributing Nations
142)	TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
143)	UN	United Nations
144)	UN-FPU	United Nations-Formed Police Units
145)	UNPOL	United Nations Police
146)	UN-SC	United Nations Security Council
147)	UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolutions
148)	USARAF	United States Army Africa
149)	5W+H	Who, Why, What, When, Where + How

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## NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence


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[www.nspcoe.org](http://www.nspcoe.org)

# NATO STABILITY POLICING UNIT (SPU) (Self-sustainable unit)

SPU based on the KFOR MSU,

UN/EU FPU models

Recommendation



## NATO STABILITY POLICING (SPIU) (Integrated within the NATO Task Force)

